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Set within the context of New Institutionalism, this article analyzes the impact of insti-
tutional change on Russian agriculture. Institutions are important because they create
opportunity and incentives. The market-based institutional framework introduced in the
1990s acted as an independent variable that facilitated growth in entrepreneurial income
and an increase in rural stratiﬁcation. Further, institutions contributed to land expansion
by a stratum of upper income households. As a dependent variable, indigenous factors
inﬂuence the economic outcomes that ﬂow from new institutions with a twofold effect:
regional variance is signiﬁcant for entrepreneurial income and land expansion; and some
households experienced much higher entrepreneurial income and land expansion.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
New Institutionalism seeks to explain institutions and
their functions instead of merely assuming their existence
(Nee, 1998, 2). An understanding of institutional change
requires a realization that an institutional framework is
created and does not just appear; that an institutional
framework develops through a process that is shaped by
a variety of factors; and that the institutional framework is
a variabledacting as both an independent and dependent
variable. The questions raised by New Institutionalism are
especially relevant to understanding the transformation of
Russian agriculture in the post-Soviet period. The purpose ofsmu.edu.
arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hathis article is to analyze the impact of institutional change on
Russian agriculture. The general arguments are fourfold: (1)
institutionsmatter, and their design and impact are crucial in
understanding behavioral responses during market reform;
(2) due to institutional chaos during the 1990s, an accurate
understanding of the impact of institutions can only be
accomplished in an environment of institutional clarity
where actors understand “the rules of the game” andwhat is
permissible; (3) institutional impact differs across regions
owing to myriad factors, in other words, variance in insti-
tutional impact at the regional level is to be expected; and (4)
household behavior impacts the institutional outcomes
examined herein more so than human capital variables.2. The analytical problem
In 1992 Russia introduced a set of new economic insti-
tutions that were designed to build a market economy.1 A
core analytical question concerns the role and efﬁcacy of1 Following the deﬁnition used by North, institutions consist of
informal constraints, formal rules, and the enforcement of both (North,
1989, 239).
nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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deemphasize institutions based on the assumption of
perfect knowledge and market efﬁciency. One critic of
neoclassic economics argued that, “the usual treatment of
institutions was superﬁcial.either these systems were
regarded as neutral in their effect on economic events and
ignored, or they were taken as given and then speciﬁed in
so perfunctory a way as to suggest that institutional inﬂu-
ence was not of much importance. By contrast, the new
institutional economics seeks, at a minimum, to demon-
strate that institutions truly matter” (Furubotn & Richter,
1991, 2).
In contrast, Nobel prize winner in economics Douglass
North, whose work represents a major revision of
neoclassic economics, argues that institutions are central
in shaping and affecting behavior. Institutions matter
because they are “humanly devised constraints that
structure human interaction” (North, 1990, 3). Taken
together these constraints “deﬁne the incentive structure
of societies and, speciﬁcally, economies” (North, 1998,
248). Institutions are not static but change over time.
Institutional change is important because it “shapes the
way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to
understanding historical change” (North, 1990, 3). He
argues that, “there is no set formula for achieving
economic development. While the sources of productivity
growth are well known, the process of economic growth is
going to vary with every society, reﬂecting the diverse
cultural heritages and the equally diverse geographic,
physical, and economic settings” (North, 2005, 165). North
concludes that institutional change occurs as a result of
learningdbehavioral change occurs and institutions are
altered because individuals perceive that the existing
institutional structure is insufﬁcient and that they could
do better by restructuring political or economic exchanges
through new institutions and norms of behavior (North,
1998, 250).
Neoclassic economists assumed that in post-Soviet
countries economic transformation would be accom-
plished merely by introducing changes that had worked
elsewhere, based upon the core elements of privatiza-
tion, liberalization, and free trade (Aslund, 2007; Wolf,
2005). Little attention was paid to sequencing, to how
new institutions would operate in the post-Soviet
environment, or whether these nations possessed the
social and political infrastructure to make markets work.
As a result, the reforms introduced by Yegor Gaidar and
Anatoly Chubais were criticized for assuming “that the
best way to create institutions necessary for an efﬁcient
market economy.would be to create private property
owners out of the state managers and blue collar
workers.. Reformers predicted that institutions would
come into being after private property was created
rather than the other way around” (Goldman, 2003, 74).
The institutions-will-come approach was also criticized
by renowned economist Joseph Stiglitz, who argued
that, “the ofﬁcials who applied the Washington
Consensus policies failed to appreciate the social context
of the transition economies” (Stiglitz, 2002, 160).
Russian reformers, backed by their Western advisors,
believed that, “if a group with vested interests inproperty could be created, it would demand the estab-
lishment of an institutional infrastructure necessary to
make a market economy work.. That is why, advocates
of privatization argued, one didn’t really need to pay
close attention to how privatization was accomplished”
(Stiglitz, 2002, 164).
3. Problems of measurement
Core ideas from the theoretical literature regarding the
salience of institutions in shaping behavior and the incen-
tive structures that are embedded in institutions may be
applied to the agricultural sector in post-Soviet Russia. The
direct measure of institutional impact may be difﬁcult,
however, because the link between national level institu-
tional change and micro-level behavior is fraught with
complications. The mere creation of institutions does not
guarantee behavioral responses that follow a pre-
determined desired course. Instead, we should understand
that institutions create opportunity and incentives. The
actual responses to institutions depend upon a set of
intervening variables that deﬁne personal characteristics
and propensitiesdage, gender, education, skill set and
training, occupation, location, and risk-taking proclivity are
examples.
Further, the problem of understanding and measuring
institutional change is complicated by additional factors:
(1) the chaotic period between the deconstruction of old
institutions and the point at which newly created institu-
tions became the dominant paradigm to guide behavior;
(2) the notion that directionless behavior during the insti-
tutional void was synonymous with resistance to new
institutions; and (3) the impact of an economic free fall on
household behavior. Each is discussed in turn.
The demise of communism in the USSR was mostly
nonviolent and bloodless as far as great revolutions are
concerned, and for that reason it is easy to forget how
chaotic the ﬁrst half of the 1990s was; for that matter,
almost the entire decade of the 1990s lacked direction and
institutional coherence. One Western journalist argued
that, “Thrown into capitalism, but lacking every institu-
tion it takes to make capitalism work.Russia in those
days was an arbitrage trader’s wet dream, a country of so
much incomplete information and so many mismatched
markets that for a few heady months it felt as if anyone
with a few connections and a nose for a deal could get
rich” (Freeland, 2000, 14). Thane Gustafson, who wrote
one of the earliest books about Russian capitalism,
perceived both positive and negative trends as Russia tried
to escape its communist past. On the positive side, the
1990s was “a time of feverish building, not only of ofﬁces
and kottedzhi for the rich, but of new businesses and
institutions based on new skills and products” (Gustafson,
1999, 6). On the negative side he observed the rise of
“crony capitalism” and the difﬁculty of overcoming the
Soviet past. He argued that, “Overcoming the Soviet legacy
is more than a matter of culture. Russia remains ‘hard-
wired’ to its Soviet past..There is also an institutional
legacy, which shows up in the way accountants measure
costs or the ﬁnancial system treats value, in the managers’
habit of relying on their friends instead of their
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the Soviet past” (Gustafson, 1999, 5, 8).
In agriculture the decade was characterized mostly by
institutional chaos. In the early post-Soviet years there
was a partial removal of limitations and regulations that
had previously stiﬂed entrepreneurship, but full-ﬂedged
property rights were absent. Take, for example, land
ownership. Private land ownership was ﬁrst legalized in
Russia (then RSFSR) in November–December 1990;
subsequently, Yeltsin’s October 1993 decree mandated
private ownership and rights of disposal through selling
agricultural land, and the Civil Code of 1994 conﬁrmed
private ownership, but reality was complicated. The
existing Land Code allowed regions to decide questions of
land ownership, and at least 10 regions had land laws
that did not recognize private ownership of land as late
as 1995 (Lerman, Csaki, & Feder, 2004, 69). Other regions
had land laws that did not prohibit land ownership, but
did not explicitly allow it either. Some regions were
compliant with federal law and allowed full ownership of
agricultural land; some allowed ownership only of
household garden land, and others allowed only land
leasing for small-scale farming. Thus, regional land laws
were a hodgepodge of varying rights and freedoms and
carried signiﬁcant limitations on land disposal. As
a result, individuals’ behavior reﬂected signiﬁcant conti-
nuity from the Soviet period regarding forms of land
tenure that favored land leasing instead of purchases
(rental rights rather than ownership rights). Further, the
federal executive and legislative branches battled over
property rights during most of the 1990s, each postu-
lating drastically versions of desired policy, which led to
confusion about what was permissible and what was not.
Improved clarity in new institutions occurred after 2001
when a new land code was adopted, followed by a 2002
law on land turnover that regulated the disposal of
agricultural land, but even so complete transparency was
absent.2
Institutional muddiness after 2001 created obstacles to
land ownership even where ownership was permitted. For
example, bureaucratic obstacles made it difﬁcult to
understand the privatization process and costly to convert
land shares to real land. Russian academic Natalya Shagaida
describes a sales process for agricultural land that is not
only expensive but also time consuming, resulting in high
transaction costs. Getting a land plot cadastred can take up
to twomonths alone, and to complete the entire multi-step
process can take up to six months (Shagaida, 2005, 134–5).
To complicate matters, the list of documents needed to
register one’s land is not strictly deﬁned by law, necessi-
tating multiple trips to the various ofﬁces and rendering
the process essentially ad hoc, as local ofﬁcials set their2 The 2002 law was not entirely “liberal” in that it placed maximum
and minimum limits on land transactions and gave local governments the
right of ﬁrst refusal for any agricultural land purchase. This law also had
institutional barriers to private ownership by making the division of
private property held as collective ownership difﬁcult. The law was
revised and amended all the way through 2010, as the government
sought to simplify the procedure for division of collective property and to
lower transaction costs of private land ownership.own requirements about which documents are needed
(Shagaida, 2004).
Another example of institutional chaos in agriculture
concerns “market” relations that were introduced as part of
economic reform in January 1992. Themyth is that economic
liberalization brought free markets and free domestic trade.
It is often forgotten that federal and regional food funds
based upon food requisitioning existed until the middle of
the 1990s and that the federal government regulated retail
food prices through 1994; in some regions it was longer and
included regulations onwholesale markups as well. Further,
after a brief interim period when food funds faded away and
“market-based” food prices emerged, regulated food prices
were reintroduced in many regions following the disastrous
1998 harvest. Thus, for much of the 1990s agricultural
markets remained regulated or semi-regulated.
This reminder about food markets that were not free is
important because institutional chaos creates incentives
that differ from the original intent of institutions. Amove to
full market relations in which large farms, private farmers,
and individuals could freely market their produce creates
one set of incentives inwhich producers presumably would
want to maximize their proﬁt-making ability. Another set
of incentives entirely is created if food cannot be freely
marketed but either is requisitioned by the government or
channeled through imperfectly functioning and mostly
manipulated wholesale markets. Agricultural production
declined signiﬁcantly during the 1990s and it should not be
discounted that at least some of the decline may be
attributed to the disincentives that occurred as a result of
the institutional arrangement in which bureaucratic enti-
ties continued their standard operating procedures from
before and new institutions had yet to emerge as dominant.
Similar to property rights, institutional clarity with regard
to market relations increased only during the second
decade of reform was begun.
A second factor that complicates an analysis of institu-
tional impact is the notion of resistance to new institutions.
Carole Leonard, for example, sees resistance from below,
maintaining that risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and private
property are eschewed in favor of a peasant moral economy
based upon Soviet-era welfare security (Leonard, 2000). A
contrasting view is presented by Maria Amelina who
argues that rural dwellers’ rationality is reﬂected in
behavioral responses that are derived from their calcula-
tions of direct and indirect beneﬁts (Amelina, 2000, 487).
Amelina’s argument is supported by Liesl Miller who
contends that, “the fact that they [collective farm
members] cling to the kolkhoz is being misinterpreted as
a sign that they are averse to risk and change. I argue that
this behavior signals a deeper understanding of their
cultural and economic needs” (Miller, 2002, 222).
Resistance from above is argued by Allina-Pisano, who
sees a grand coalition of bureaucrats and ofﬁcials from the
local level to Moscow united in covert action to resist and
obstruct land privatization. These interests were “different,
yet aligned,” and they coordinated their efforts to hinder
land privatization (Allina-Pisano, 2008, 82–83). This grand
conspiracy of actors included leaders of district adminis-
trations, state economists, land tenure specialists, land
committee members, village councils, and farm managers.
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rural dwellers resisted land privatization as well (Allina-
Pisano, 2008, 193).3
The larger point is that the formative period of reform in
Russia yielded the partial dismantling of Soviet-era insti-
tutions combined with imperfectly deﬁned and functioning
market-based institutions, leading to a situation that any
rational actorwouldﬁndconfusing andwouldwant to avoid.
Institutional confusion was hardly unique to Russiadother
authors found similar chaos in other post-Soviet states with
speciﬁc application to land and property rights (Verdery,
2003). Even though anecdotal evidence suggests that some
low-level resistance did occur in the earliest years of reform,
a context of institutional chaos makes it very difﬁcult to
categorize most behavior as resistance.
A third factor that complicates the measurement of
institutional impact concerns the relationship between an
economic free fall and adaptive household behavior. The
collapse of Russia’s economy in the 1990s, culminating in
ﬁnancial collapse in August 1998 (a collapse that occurred
in agricultural production during the 1990s as well), gave
rise to households’ priority goal of survivaldmaintaining or
if possible improving their standard of living in an envi-
ronment of economic decline (Kalugina, 2000). The quest
for survival above all else for a large percentage of rural
households made it difﬁcult for Western analysts to
understand behavioral change, a point emphasized by
a well-known Russian specialist on agriculture who argued
that, “recessionary times do not create economic incentives
for production units and therefore do not induce real
transformation” (Serova, 2000, 103).
Even though survival may have been paramount, the
literature characterizes the 1990s as a time when people
were scrambling to ﬁgure out ways to adjust, to become
one of the fortunate ones in new Russia. Of course, there
were groups of people who were not able to adapt for
a variety of reasons, poverty rates rose, and economic
differentiation became signiﬁcant. But among those who
were not trapped in the past, survival was achieved by
adaptation to new economic realities and opportunities. As3 Both Leonard’s and Pisano’s arguments are problematic. Neither of
these analyses regard time as a variabledthat the impact of new insti-
tutions takes timednor, with their end of history scenarios, can they
account for the emergence of a successful private farming sector after
2004. Moreover, resistance was not a primary characteristic of Russia’s
agrarian or land reform. Leonard’s thesis is unable to explain the emer-
gence of an upper stratum of rural household producers that has been
shown to not only have increased land holdings by signiﬁcant amounts,
but also are distinctive in their level of income, food production, and food
sales, occurrences that have also been found by several authors. Absent
from Allina-Pisano’s analysis is the fact that reform instructions were
often vague, unspeciﬁc, contradictory, and incomplete, thereby requiring
local actors to improvise as best they could. Further, her argument
neglects to mention that the design of reform asked farm managers to
distribute land and allow workers to leave, at the same time that mangers
continued to be responsible for food deliveries to the state, and later, to
be proﬁtable. Thus, what is postulated as resistance may be alternatively
understood as rational responses to contradictory goals within a context
of institutional uncertainty. A rational actor would be expected to utilize
formal institutions when they are more stable and secure, and there are
mechanisms for third-party enforcement. Evidence of rational responses
to institutions includes an increase in land purchases by individuals and
businesses over time, and the conversion of land shares to real property.time passed the old ways of survivalddependence on
transfer payments and state wagesdbecame increasingly
untenable as pensions were too low to survive and lagged
inﬂation, and as chronic wage arrears became the new
reality. Thus, those who could adapt to survive, did so, and
they did so by decreasing reliance on traditional survival
strategies of rural households: household labor and
informal networks. The transition to new survival strate-
gies is measurable in two ways. First, the effects of house-
hold labor and the effects of rental land on household
income exerted inﬂuence independently as time went on,
that is, the effect were separate effects could be quantiﬁed,
showing the property holdings became more and more
important (O’Brien, Wegren, & Patsiorkovsky, 2007, 42–3).
Second, during 1995–2006 the percentage of household
income that was non-monetized declined, that is, reliance
on food produced and consumed by the household
declined, thus indicating that as time passed the quest for
survival was replaced by a pursuit of growth (O’Brien,
Wegren, & Patsiorkovsky, 2010, 603).
To be sure, adaptation to new institutions was not always
unilinear, consistent, or successful. Some households had
better skill sets and resources that could be converted to
income making activity in a market economy. Further,
missteps occurred for reasons that households could control,
for instance, amisallocationof resourcesora failedhousehold
business; and because of factors outside of their controldfor
example, unclear, contradictory, and confusing land rights;
wholesale markets and input supply lines that were often
manipulated; and a credit market that was anything but
transparent (Serova& Shick, 2008; Shagaida& Lerman, 2008;
Yastrebova, Subbotin, & Epshtein, 2008). Nonetheless, incre-
mental, but important, adaptive behaviorwas taking place at
the household level even during the 1990s (O’Brien,
Patsiorkovski, & Dershem, 2000). As time passed the
economy stabilized and then grew, and institutions gained
clarity and predictability. As a result, the incremental adap-
tation of the 1990s began to transform itself into signiﬁcant
stratiﬁcation after 2000 (O’Brien and Patsiorkovsky, 2006,
95–107). It became clear that an adaptive cohort of rural
actors, not just private farmers, had embraced the opportu-
nities embodied in thenew institutional frameworkandwere
successful in achieving economic growth, increased welfare,
and income differentiation (Uzun, 2010).
4. Institutional impact as an independent variable
Post-Soviet institutions have experienced many short-
comings: by their absence at critical times, by the contradic-
tions in design and in implementation. Nonetheless, market-
based institutions have had a demonstrable impact on
economic behavior. The theoretical literature suggests that
institutions create opportunity and incentives that shape
behavior. Market reform institutions as an independent vari-
able and their effect on economic behavior can be illustrated
by two components of wellbeing: income and property.
4.1. Household income
Continuity with the Soviet period is found in the fact that
households continue to pursue mixed income strategies.
Table 1
Mean per capita monetary income for rural population, by federal district,
1995–2009 (rubles per month).
1995 2000 2005 2009
Mean for Russian federation 237 985 3646 9619
Central 182 645 2260 6605
Northwest 256 956 3133 7884
Southern 150 629 2293 6467
Volga 184 759 2675 7210
Urals 302 1207 4088 10,321
Siberia 245 850 2872 7015
Far East 320 1099 3824 9496
Notes: a. per capita income is nominal. b. numbers have been rounded. c.
income for rural population was calculated using rural incomes as % of
national income based on government averages. d. monetary income for
rural population excludes non-monetized income that is consumed. e.
income is not adjusted for regional differences in cost of living.Sources:
Regiony Rossii 2001, 2001, 110–11; Regiony Rossii 2005, 2006, 157–8;
Regiony Rossii 2010, 2010, 164–5; Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik,
2001, 187; Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2007, 184; Rossiiskii
statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2010, 180; and author’s calculations.
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affects sources of income in a positiveway that is accessible to
most households. Institutional change created new oppor-
tunities to develop household enterprise. Rural residentsmay
become self-employed and start a household business, or can
hire themselves out in whatever employment they ﬁnd,
either agricultural or non-agricultural. Uncovering collective
adaptation during the economic downturn, Allina-Pisano
writes that, “agricultural cooperatives set up sewing shops,
smokehouses, carding and combing shops, oil presses, and
brick factories.” Other collectives sewed polyethylene bags
and fur hats (Allina-Pisano, 2008, 39). As a result of entre-
preneurship and seizing new opportunity, the portion of
household income that came from farm employment and
transfer payments decreased (O’Brien, Wegren, &
Patsiorkovsky, 2005, 272–5). In addition, reform institutions
deregulated the labor market and allowed rural dwellers to
search out non-farm employment. Based on survey data
Lerman and his colleagues discovered an increase in non-
agricultural employment whereby an increasing portion of
rural households’ income came from non-agricultural work
(Lerman, Serova, & Zvyagintsev, 2008, 66–7).
The effect of these processes was twofold. First, atten-
dant with a rise in household income, household enterprise
began to occupy a more prominent place in the structure of
total income. In upper income households the income from
household business became very signiﬁcant, although
there is signiﬁcant regional variation. Second, because
levels of income from household enterprise far outstrip the
level of transfer payments and exceed income levels from
farm employment, the gap between the entrepreneurial
and non-entrepreneurial widened and rural stratiﬁcation
increased (O’Brien and Patsiorkovsky, 2006, 95–107). Thus,
the countryside became more differentiated, and this
reality is illustrated by region in Table 1.
The increase in income stratiﬁcation may be measured at
the household level using a coefﬁcient of differentiation.4 For
example, in a 2001 survey of 800 rural households the coef-
ﬁcient of differentiation was 5.6; the coefﬁcient of differenti-
ation rose to 6.3 in a 2003 survey of 382 rural households; and
it increased to10.8 ina2006surveyof900ruralhouseholds. In
other words, in 2006 the households in the upper 10 percent
had almost 11 times the mean monthly monetary income as
the lowest10percentofhouseholds. Therefore, since2000 it is
clear that stratiﬁcation increased as more monetary income
was concentrated in upper income households.4.2. Property rights
Institutional change legalized private land ownership
and the buying and selling of agricultural land. The insti-
tutional design of land reform affected individuals’ property
rights in fundamental ways. For private citizens and rural
households, the design of reform determined or greatly
inﬂuenced: (1) the predominant types of land that would be
used and owned; (2) howmuch land could be owned; (3) the4 A coefﬁcient of differentiation is deﬁned as the ratio of monetary
income by the top 10 percent of households compared to the bottom 10
percent of households.incentives that individuals had to lease their land shares to
large farms, in effect helping to keep them intact; and (4)
imposed inherent limits on income due to the small amount
of land that most households held in ownership or was in
use (Wegren, 2009, 136–7).
The positive effects of liberalized property rights are
somewhat less straightforward than rising household
income and increased earnings from entrepreneurship. On
the one hand, more agricultural land is in private hands than
at any time in Russia’s history. Formally, at the beginning of
2010 private citizens and business owned more than 133
million hectares of land in Russia;most privately owned land
is agricultural land, and with 190 million hectares of agri-
cultural land inuse in2010 itmeans thatprivate ownershipof
land constituted about 70 percent of agricultural land that
was in use (Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad o
sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 38, 47). On the other
hand, farm members who received land shares held theo-
retical rights to ownership, but these shares were seldom
converted to actual land for a variety of reasons. At the
beginning of 2010, private citizens owned 123 million hect-
ares, of which, 104 million were owned as land shares
(Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad o sostoianii i
ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 47). Thus, for the overwhelming
number of rural dwellers, their real private land continued to
be their garden plot, and the size of these plots tended to
increase only incrementally if at all. For most rural dwellers,
the amount of land that they owned or used did not differ
signiﬁcantly fromtheamount that theyhadused in theSoviet
period. Signiﬁcant increases in land holdings are evident for
only a relatively few, mostly upper income households, and
the number of high-income households is small. Only a thin
stratum of households signiﬁcantly expanded their land
holdings and economically differentiated themselves from
the rest of the community (Petrikov, 2007; Uzun, 2010).55 Behavioral responses to reform institutions are differentiated by
household income level and by profession. Private farmers and farm
managers increased the size of their land holdings the most, while
common farm workers may be considered “losers” in terms of the
amount of real land they hold as private property.
Table 2
Mean per capita entrepreneurial income for rural population, by federal
district, 2000–2009 (rubles per month).
2000 2005 2009 Difference
from national
mean in 2009
Mean for Russian Federation 152 416 933 –
Central 91 221 515 418
Northwest 124 241 465 468
Southern 136 408 989 þ56
Volga 136 361 757 176
Urals 124 417 1094 þ161
Siberia 146 370 723 210
Far East 166 421 1035 þ102
Notes: a. per capita income is nominal. b. numbers have been round-
ed.Sources: Table 1; Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2010, 178–179;
and author’s calculations.
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regional variance
The discussion in Section 4 indicated that market-based
institutions act as an independent variable, creating
incentives and inﬂuencing behavior in discernible ways
although with variegated impacts. Institutions also act as
a dependent variable, which is to say that institutions will
be impacted by different inﬂuences. Centrally-crafted
institutions deﬁne the parameters for what is possible,
but speciﬁc behavior will vary according to regional factors
and conditions. In contrast to North and other scholars who
theorize about the role of institutions at the state level,
Hopcroft emphasizes the “importance of local.” Using late
17th and early 18th century England as a historical case
study, her analysis serves as a “reminder that local insti-
tutions play an important role in development in the same
way that state institutions do” (Hopcroft, 1998, 278).
Hopcroft’s emphasis on the local applies to agrarian
change in Russia. Because Russia is so large, outcomes from
reform institutions differ across regions. This section uses
institutions as a dependent variable and demonstrates
regional variance. Proceeding from the hypothesis that
institutions matter and that their impact can be measured
at the national level, we now are interested in behavioral
outcomes that are consistent with those institutions but
that play out somewhat differently across regions. The
point is to show that regional differences may, and do,
occur within the framework of national level institutions.
The analysis below illustrates differing institutional impact
at the regional level. As before, the measures representing
market institutions are income and land ownership, and
these are used as the dependent variables.
Turning ﬁrst to income, ofﬁcial government statistics
disaggregate the structure of personal income and one of
the categories is “income from entrepreneurial activity.” As
one would expect there is considerable regional variance in
the portion of income coming from entrepreneurial
activity, ranging from a low of 5.9 percent in the Northwest
Federal District to 15.3 percent in the Southern Federal
District (Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2010, 178–9).
Ethnic regions located in the Southern district tend to
derive the highest percentages of total income from
entrepreneurial activity. I was able to calculate mean rural
monetary per capita income by federal district (Table 1);
from that and using the structure of income reported by the
Russian government I estimated how much income is
derived from entrepreneurial activity. Regional trends
during 2000–2009 are illustrated in Table 2.
The table provides an approximate measure of regional
differencesdabsent of speciﬁc data certain assumptions
had to made.6 Nonetheless, the table reﬂects two realities:
(1) localized inﬂuences lead to regional variance in the level
of entrepreneurial activity; note for example that the
spread between high entrepreneurial income and low6 For example, government data do not differentiate the structure of
income between urban and rural dwellers and only one percentage per
region or district is indicated. Therefore, I assume that the reported
percent was accurate for rural incomes.entrepreneurial income is 629 rubles per person per month
in 2009, a considerable difference; and (2) an increase in
per capita income from entrepreneurial activity over time
across all regions. The larger point is that the data reﬂect
the effects of regional factors on national level institutions
that facilitated entrepreneurship and market-based
behavior.
The second measure that illustrates varying institu-
tional impact due to regional factors concerns property
rights, expressed as private land ownership. For the
country as a whole, private citizens and business have not
and continue not to own a large percent of all the land in
Russia, and this reality has not changedmuch over time. For
instance, in January 2002 state and municipal ownership
accounted for 92.4 percent of Russia’s total land. In
contrast, private individuals owned only 7.6 percent of
Russia’s landdcitizens held 122.8 million hectares and
another 6.2 million hectares were owned by businesses
(Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad o sostoianii i
ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2002, 34). Most privately owned land
in Russia is agricultural land, and of the agricultural land
area owned by citizens, 112.9 million hectares (88 percent)
were owned as land shares in 2002. Land shares are paper
entitlements to land but seldom converted to real land.
Most agricultural land, therefore, had theoretical, but not
real, owners. The remaining 12 percent of agricultural land
was owned by private farmers, private plot operators, and
other small-scale agricultural users.
After several years of solid economic growth, the bulk of
land ownership remained in state hands. Combined, citi-
zens and business owned only 7.8 percent of Russia’s land
at the beginning of 2010, whereas federal and municipal
ownership accounted for 92.2 percentda decline of only .2
percent from 2002 (Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad
o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 47). Within the
category of privately owned land, by January 1, 2010 the
amount of land owned by citizens rose slightly to 123.1
million hectares, and businesses increased their ownership
to 10.3 million hectares. As before, agricultural land
constituted the vast majority of privately owned landd97
percent of land owned by citizens and 99.9 percent of land
owned by business (Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad
o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 49). Although there
was some increase in the conversion of land shares after
Table 3















land that is owned
by citizens
% of regional arable
agricultural land that
is owned by citizens
Russian federation 1709 400 123.1 10.2 31% 56%
Central 65 38.7 21.3 3.1 55% 64%
Northwest 169 34.2 4.4 .46 13% 69%
Southern 42 33.0 18.0 1.1 55% 57%
Volga 104 59.0 32.5 3.2 55% 59%
Urals 181 49.5 9.3 .51 19% 57%
Siberia 514 100.9 30.8 1.3 31% 54%
Far East 617 70.8 2.2 .16 3% 28%
Notes: a. Numbers have been rounded. b. Land ownership by citizens includes land shares.Sources: Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad o sostoianii i
ispol’zovanii zemel’ Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2010, 16, 178–82, 186–90; author’s calculations.
9 The last column in the table shows ownership rates if arable agri-
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land held in ownership at the beginning of 2010
(Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny) doklad o sostoianii i
ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 49–50).
Signiﬁcant differences in private land ownership are
evident at the regional level. Table 3 illustrates that
regional differentiation exists for land ownership by citi-
zens and by business. The table shows the total land area of
each federal district, the amount of land that is classiﬁed as
agricultural, and the number of hectares owned by citizens
and by business. Land ownership rates by citizens are low
for the country as a whole when total land is used for
measurement (7 percent); this is especially true in the
northwest district (3 percent) and districts east of the Urals
(5 percent in Urals, 6 percent in Siberia, and less than 1
percent in Far East).7 Of course, ownership rates of total
land is somewhat misleading because such land includes
types of land that a person would not own, for example,
forested land, national parks and protected land, land used
for industrial plants, land zoned for urban development,
land surrounding bodies of water, and land reserves. These
categories of land constitute more than 75 percent of
Russia’s total land mass, with forests and protected lands
accounting for 67 percent (Gosudarstvennyi (natsional’ny)
doklad o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’, 2010, 8).
Ownership rates improve signiﬁcantly if agricultural
land is used as the basis for measurement, and because
most privately owned land is agricultural, this is a more
accurate measure than total land. The most important
column in the table is the one showing ownership rates of
agricultural land in each federal district. The table shows
signiﬁcant regional variancedfrom a low of 3 percent in
the Far East district to a high of 55 percent in the Central,
Southern, and Volga districts. Importantly, two of the three
districts with the highest ownership rates are favorable to
agriculture. This column, therefore, provides an interesting
picture of land ownership rates by rural households.8 At the7 Rates of ownership for total land in a region were calculated but not
included in the table.
8 Other than private plot operators, a landowner will have a mix of
arable and non-arable land, the latter including some forested land, some
land used for roads, some swamp and marsh land, some land surrounding
water, and other land that is unsuitable for agricultural production.same time, if land owned as land shares was excluded the
percentages would be much lower.9
The larger point from the table is that regional factors
affect the way in which institutions play out. Although this
analysis looks only at federal districts, at the oblast level
land ownership rates are inﬂuenced by structural factors
such as the percentage of land that is forested, how much
agricultural land exists, natural conditions and climate, and
the demographic proﬁle of the population in a given region.
Thus, local factors matter and inﬂuence outcomes from
market institutions.6. Institutional impact as a dependent variable:
household-level inﬂuences
Similar to Section 5, this section uses entrepreneurial
income and land ownership as dependent variables to
measure the effects of household inﬂuences on institu-
tional outcomes. The task here is to examine the factors
that affect entrepreneurial income and land expansion at
the household level. Survey data are used for the
analysis.10
Signiﬁcant differences exist in level of household
income and income generated from entrepreneurial
activity depending on the region, locationwithin the region
(peri-urban, rural, remote), the mixed income strategy of
the households, the age structure of the household, the
profession of the main breadwinners, the gender of head of
household, and production capital (livestock, car, truck)
possessed by the household. Space constraints prohibit
a detailed examination of the effects of each of those
variables on entrepreneurial income at the household level,
although there is reason to believe that the effects would be
statistically signiﬁcant.cultural land is used as the basis for measurement. Of course, in reality,
a landowner, particularly a private farmer or individual entrepreneur, will
not have only arable land in his land holdings. The calculation of arable
land is simply included to illustrate that, theoretically, land ownership
rates by citizens for arable agricultural land are respectable and support
the idea that institutions matter.
10 The survey consists of data from 900 rural households obtained in
person-to-person interviews in nine regions of Russia, with at least one
region from each of the federal districts.
Table 5
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human capital and real land as independent variables. The
model examines their impact on entrepreneurial income.
The human capital variable includes the number of
household members, number of pensioners, and
a weighted value of adult labor. Two iterations of the land
variable were run, the ﬁrst using the increase in real land
during 1991–2006, the second using the amount of real
land possessed by the household at the time the survey was
taken. Real land excludes land held as land shares and
includes rental land, a household garden plot, and other
actual land used by the household. The human capital and
land variables were regressed on entrepreneurial income,
with the results indicated in Table 4. Both models in the
table are statistically signiﬁcant.
The human capital variables are not statistically signif-
icant at or below the .05 level, but they are signed in the
expected direction. The number of pensioners has a nega-
tive effect on entrepreneurial income; and both adult labor
and size of family have a positive effect, which means that
households with more members who are of working age
may have higher levels of entrepreneurial income. Most
important, the table shows clearly the effects of real land on
entrepreneurial income: households that increase their
holdings of real land (the main method of increase is
through land rental) are more likely to have higher levels of
entrepreneurial income. Likewise, households with larger
holdings of real land (the result of land expansion) aremore
likely to have higher levels of entrepreneurial income. The
increase in real land and total holdings of real land are
statistically signiﬁcant and both variables have strong
explanatory power, as indicated by the standardized coef-
ﬁcients .478 and .498. The regression coefﬁcients reinforce
what Pallot and Nefedova found in their ﬁeldwork.
Although there is regional variation in what households
produce, in general, increases in rental land are normally
used to feed or support more livestock, which in turn
contributes to enhanced income from food sales (Pallot &
Nefedova, 2007). The level of entrepreneurial income is
important because it is one of the primary mechanisms of
stratiﬁcation in the Russian countryside. Households with
high entrepreneurial income and larger holdings of real
land are poised to beneﬁt going forward, and thus strati-
ﬁcation in the countryside is unlikely to abate.
The second dependent variable representing market
institutions is land expansion, and again we are interested
in real land, not expansion through land shares. TheTable 4
Regression of human capital and land variables on entrepreneurial income
(standardized coefﬁcients).
Model 1 Model 2
Adult Labor .031 .026
Size of Family .064 .060
Number of pensioners .039 .037
Increase in real land .478* –
Total holdings of real land – .498*
Adj. R squared .24 .26
*p < .01.
Note: a. real land excludes land held as land shares.Source: Author’s
survey data, n ¼ 900.analysis employs two independent variables: the same
elements of human capital used above, and total monetary
household income. The income variable includes income
from a number of sourcesdsalaries from employment,
entrepreneurial income, and food sales are primary sources
of household income. This variable excludes non-monetary
income that is consumed by the household, for instance the
value of food produced on the household garden plot.
Further, the monetary income variable is important
because it includes (but does not specify) a range of
behaviordsuppose the husband obtained a second job to
increase his total compensation, or that the household
increased its food sales, or that a household member
obtained non-agricultural employment. There are
a number of different routes and strategies to higher
income, but the point is that households with higher
income were distinctive.
Twomodels were run, the ﬁrst using the increase in real
land since 1991 as the dependent variable, and the second
using the increase in rental land since 1991 as the depen-
dent variable. Both models in the table are statistically
signiﬁcant. Because most increases in real land consist of
rental land, the results indicated in Table 5 are very similar
for the two models.
For both models, the table shows that human capital is
signed negatively, which means that it has little to no effect
on land expansion. Households that want to expand land
holdings will do so without being held back by their
demographic proﬁle. Further, the negative signature of
adult labor suggests that households are willing and able to
ﬁnd substitutes for manual labor. The variable with the
strongest explanatory power is total monetary income,
which indicates that decisions to expand real land holdings
center around monetary means more so than labor to work
the land. This ﬁnding makes sense because aside from
private farmers, most households enlarge their land hold-
ings bymodest amounts, usually notmore than a hectare or
two on average.
The larger point from these two tables is that they show
how household characteristics and behavior impact insti-
tutional outcomes. In the case of entrepreneurial income,
household behavior is paramountdthe decision to increase
real land holdings. In the case of land expansion, human
capital is secondary to monetary capital. Thus, toRegression of human capital and income variables on land increase
(standardized coefﬁcients).
Model 1 (increase in





Adult Labor .154 .154
Size of Family .003 .004
Number of pensioners .046 .045
Sum of monetary income
for all household members
.332* .332*
Adj. R squared .08 .08
*p < .01.
Note: a. real land excludes land held as land shares.Source: Author’s
survey data, n ¼ 900.
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into account household level inﬂuences.
7. Conclusion
When one thinks about the characteristics of Russia’s
agricultural economy today, the core elements that deﬁned
Soviet agriculture do not come tominddstate ownership of
agricultural land, obligatory plans and production quotas,
regulated food and labor markets, the dominance of state–
owned large farms, state controlled income levels, and
strict regulation of entrepreneurial activity. Today, those
aspects have been replaced by a signiﬁcant degree of
private ownership of agricultural land, producers that
respond to market conditions and demand, functioning
wholesale markets, freedom to choose one’s place of
employment, a mixed agricultural economy comprised of
large farms, medium farms, private farms, and private
entrepreneurs, the absence of state control over incomes,
and opportunities for entrepreneurship. Were these
developments an accident? Did they just happen? Was the
transformation of Russia’s agricultural economy a coinci-
dence? No. This article argues that change occurred
because institutions matter.
This broad argument was pursued in separate sections.
Section 4 argued that market-based institutions created
opportunity and incentives that led to an increase in
entrepreneurial income and expanded land ownership of
agricultural land. Traditional sources of rural household
income (labor) were combined with opportunities created
by new institutions (entrepreneurship and property). In
effect, households’ adaptation strategy blended traditional
institutions with new market-based institutions. This
ﬁnding is entirely consistent with New Institutionalism.
The article proceeded to show that institutions are also
inﬂuenced by different factors. Section 5 used entrepre-
neurial income and private land ownership as dependent
variables representing market institutions, showing that
indigenous regional factors affect the way in which insti-
tutions play out. In other words, institutional impact differs
across regions because each region has its own constella-
tion of factors that impinge upon the functioning of insti-
tutions. Speciﬁcally, this section showed signiﬁcant
regional variance in per capita entrepreneurial income,
a range of 629 rubles per capita per month; and in the
amount of agricultural land that is privately owned, ranging
from 3 percent to 55 percent.
Section 6 used entrepreneurial income and an increase
in real land as dependent variables tomeasure the effects of
household inﬂuences on institutional outcomes. For each,
two models were run. For entrepreneurial income, house-
holds that increase their holdings of real land and that have
larger holdings of real land are more likely to have higher
levels of entrepreneurial income. For land expansion, it was
shown that total monetary household income has a strong
and statistically signiﬁcant effect, in contrast to human
capital variables whose effects are weak and not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
To conclude, this article makes two important contri-
butions. First, the article adds to our knowledge of agrarian
reform in post-communist Russiadspeciﬁcally, the effectsof agrarian reform policies and how regional and house-
hold variance is occurringwith regard to household income
and land. Second, the article contributes to our under-
standing of New Institutionalism. In particular, the article
contributes to the discussion of how institutions originate.
At one extreme, institutions are said to arise spontaneously,
while at the other extreme institutions are organized by
a central authority (Furubotn & Richter, 1991, 3). Sections 5
and 6 of this article add nuance to the theory, showing that
regional and household inﬂuences are important, and in
that way institutions are neither entirely spontaneous nor
fully centrally driven. In that respect, Russia’s reformers of
the 1990s had it wrong on both accountsdinstitutions
would not magically appear following privatization, and
institutional outcomes are not wholly controllable from the
center.
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